One person transfers money and expressly asks that nobody learn their name. Another agrees to public recognition. A third tells friends about a gift but asks that the amount remain private. Which of the three is being most generous?
A familiar belief supplies a quick answer: the quiet gift is the most honest because nobody can win applause for it. That sounds plausible at first. But it overlooks the personal reasons behind discreet giving and the ways public recognition can serve a cause. Above all, knowing whether someone's name appears on a website does not tell us their motives.
I am therefore less interested in morally judging a published name than in asking what visibility does to a gift. Who does the giver want to show something to? What does it mean for the recipient when a gift becomes known? And can experiments in which people give more under observation really reveal whether other people's welfare matters to them? Research answers that last question in particular much more cautiously than some headlines would suggest.
There are several levels of visibility
We tend to imagine anonymity as two alternatives: either the name appears or it does not. In reality, a gift can become visible to very different degrees. Sometimes only the recipient knows who provided it. Sometimes an organisation or a few trusted people know while the giver remains publicly unknown. Another version makes the name known but neither the amount nor the precise occasion. Others deliberately associate a gift with themselves and discuss it openly.
This is more than a technical detail. Someone privately giving to a person close to them can certainly be seen and appreciated without any outsider knowing. Someone supporting an organisation, by contrast, may want public acknowledgement without having any personal relationship with the eventual beneficiaries. With large private gifts, names, amounts and circumstances can be sensitive information for both sides.
For the psychological question, we should therefore distinguish wanting to be noticed by the recipient, wanting recognition among one's own acquaintances and reaching a wider public. These forms can serve different functions. Their effects cannot safely be treated as interchangeable in research either.
What happens when others watch?
An especially vivid field experiment comes from economist Adriaan Soetevent. For his study published in 2005, collection methods were randomly varied over 29 weeks in 30 Dutch churches. With closed bags, those nearby could not see individual contributions. With open baskets, they could observe what neighbours put in and how much had already been collected.
For collections supporting external causes, contributions initially rose by approximately ten per cent under the visible arrangement. The effect faded over time, however. No equivalent effect appeared for internal purposes. Even this single study shows how strongly situation, collection type and duration matter. Openness changed behaviour under certain conditions, but certainly not always.
Another limitation matters too: looking into an open basket also reveals how much others give. The study therefore cannot attribute every effect unambiguously to wanting a good reputation. Information about the cause or other people's behaviour may also influence decisions. And naturally it tells us nothing about how someone would decide if they could give several million euros to a stranger.
Nevertheless, the experiment raises an intriguing question. Why can it matter whether others observe our generosity? Apparently, our social surroundings can influence not only how we think about an action but, under some circumstances, how much we actually do.
The person becomes part of the signal
In an experimental paper published in 2009, Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha and Stephan Meier examined what is known as image motivation: the desire to be seen positively by others. The researchers showed that visibility can matter in prosocial behaviour. They also examined how financial incentives can alter the effect of this motive.
The underlying idea is simple enough. An action can benefit others while communicating something about the person performing it. Someone giving money publicly may appear generous, engaged or responsible. Initially, that is a possible social effect. It does not yet tell us whether the help is therefore less sincerely meant.
In laboratory experiments published in 200400040-9), James Andreoni and Ragan Petrie examined how contributions to a public good changed when others received information about contributors' identities and contribution amounts. The combination of both had a particularly marked influence on behaviour. The researchers also tested arrangements resembling familiar forms of public donor recognition.
That is methodologically informative, but a laboratory contribution to a public good is not a private transfer of wealth. Above all, a gift's possible reputational effect should not automatically be treated as evidence of hidden calculation. People can enjoy helping someone and like being considered helpful at the same time. Those motives need not contradict one another.
When your name goes on the donor list
A study by Dean Karlan and Margaret McConnell brought the subject closer to charitable fundraising in practice. In a field experiment published in 2014 involving a student charity, offering public recognition increased donations. The authors combined the field study with a laboratory experiment to distinguish wanting to improve one's reputation from wanting to encourage others to donate through visible giving. Their results primarily supported the importance of social image.
We can acknowledge that without issuing a damning judgement on the people involved. In such an experiment, a public thank-you changes behaviour. It does not reveal whether an individual donor would otherwise have given nothing or how they think about their action. The study describes average effects in a particular setting, not complete personality profiles.
Nor is an interest in recognition confined to wealthy people. Someone investing time, supporting a club or providing visible help may also enjoy having it noticed. With large fortunes, the same social dynamic may attract more attention. That does not automatically make its psychological mechanisms entirely different.
Publicity can help and still be uncomfortable
A published name can do more than provide a friendly pat on the back. When a well-known person discusses their support publicly, they may draw attention to a cause that would otherwise receive little notice. Someone funding a project may also want to acknowledge taking responsibility. Public giving can inspire others, raise questions or enable discussion of how the money is used.
That is a possible function of publicity, not a general rule for success. Whether naming someone actually generates further support must be examined case by case. In their particular laboratory approach, Karlan and McConnell found no convincing support for the explanation that givers were primarily trying to encourage others to join in. That certainly does not disprove every inspirational effect of public donations. It merely advises caution when people explain their own intentions or others' motives with great certainty afterwards.
Sometimes naming the giver gets in the way of the purpose itself. Attention shifts to their wealth, status or biography, leaving the recipient a minor character. With a private gift especially, that can be uncomfortable. Someone may want to accept support without becoming a public example of another person's generosity.
The possible cost of public recognition therefore deserves consideration before anything is published. If the gift concerns a recipient, their privacy is no decorative detail.
Research also offers counterexamples
Publicity certainly does not increase giving under every condition. In seven experimental studies, Bonnie Simpson, Katherine White and Juliano Laran examined when public recognition can actually be counterproductive. Among people with a stronger independent sense of self, public visibility reduced willingness to donate or donation amounts under certain conditions. Wanting to act for one's own reasons rather than under other people's gaze played a part.
Another counterexample comes from Lorenz Goette and Egon Tripodi. In field experiments published in 2024, they examined the effects of social recognition through groups and social media among Italian blood donors. A straightforward request to donate was at least as effective as offering public recognition. Indications of possible negative effects arose particularly where recognition was offered to people already seen as especially exemplary.
Blood donations are, of course, not gifts of money, and nobody should apply these results to private millionaires as though the situations were identical. Nevertheless, they offer a useful reminder: visibility can feel like recognition or like an inappropriate attempt to place a public stamp on a voluntary act.
Perhaps that also helps explain why some people want to remain particularly quiet about a gift that matters to them. Not because their motive is automatically purer, but because they want to experience the action as their own choice, independent of other people's judgement.
Anonymity can protect, but proves nothing
An anonymous gift is not automatically selfless. Someone remaining anonymous may want to avoid conflict, protect their privacy or prevent a stream of future expectations. Disliking public attention is also an entirely understandable personal reason. It does not turn the gift into a moral examination that only invisible people pass.
Conversely, allowing one's name to be mentioned need not mean seeking applause. Perhaps someone wants a contribution to be clearly attributable to them. Perhaps they want to involve someone in a decision. Perhaps they really do enjoy recognition. Even then, it remains an open question whether the decision helped the recipient and what conditions accompanied it.
A 2006 theoretical paper by Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole describes self-interest, social reputation and self-image as intertwined motives for prosocial behaviour. Among other things, the model explains why visible incentives can enhance a voluntary act but, under some circumstances, also damage the impression it makes. It is no substitute for asking particular people. It simply highlights why a single moral label rarely does the subject justice.
I therefore find another question more useful than searching for the “truly selfless” donor: what form of visibility fits the relationship and the wishes of those involved? Answering it requires neither performing one's modesty nor putting one's name on everything.
What this means for Tired of Wealth
At Tired of Wealth, too, a possible private gift would initially be a personal matter. I am willing to accept wealth someone voluntarily gives away. But the unusual openness of that offer certainly does not imply that a giver would have to be publicly introduced. I have no reason to publish names, amounts or personal circumstances without express consent.
That is an important distinction for me. The project can be visible because I openly stand behind it. Another person's decision belongs initially to them. Someone can find my idea interesting without making their wealth public. And someone wanting to speak openly would still need to agree with everyone affected what should actually become public. I will not invent supposed donors or previous gifts to give an idea more weight.
Why people give wealth away considers the motives that lead people to give at all. Should I tell people how much money I have? explores openness and privacy around personal wealth. An actual transfer also involves the recipient's perspective, discussed in What happens when money changes hands?.
Who owns the story of a gift?
Public recognition can encourage giving, hinder it or have little effect. Research shows different outcomes depending on the situation, person and social surroundings. It provides no reliable test of who acts for the best reasons. That is probably just as well. A published name is, after all, no window into its owner's mind.
For me, the central question is who gets to decide the story of a gift. Givers have an interest in choosing their own visibility. Recipients have an equally legitimate interest in not becoming part of a public narrative without being asked. Sometimes both happily agree. Sometimes they want to keep it between themselves.
Generosity needs no audience, but it can have one. What it becomes depends less on the volume of the thank-you than on whether those involved respect one another's decisions and boundaries.
Sources
Soetevent, Adriaan R. (2005). “Anonymity in giving in a natural context: A field experiment in 30 churches”. Journal of Public Economics, 89(11–12), pp. 2301 to 2323. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.11.002
Ariely, Dan, Anat Bracha and Stephan Meier (2009). “Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially”. American Economic Review, 99(1), pp. 544 to 555. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.1.544
Andreoni, James, and Ragan Petrie (2004). “Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising”. Journal of Public Economics, 88(7–8), pp. 1605 to 1623. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00040-900040-9)
Karlan, Dean, and Margaret A. McConnell (2014). “Hey look at me: The effect of giving circles on giving”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 106, pp. 402 to 412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.013
Simpson, Bonnie, Katherine White and Juliano Laran (2018). “When Public Recognition for Charitable Giving Backfires: The Role of Independent Self-Construal”. Journal of Consumer Research, 44(6), pp. 1257 to 1273. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucx101
Goette, Lorenz, and Egon Tripodi (2024). “The limits of social recognition: Experimental evidence from blood donors”. Journal of Public Economics, 231, Article 105069. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105069
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole (2006). “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior”. American Economic Review, 96(5), pp. 1652 to 1678. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.5.1652